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Criminal Procedure: Walker v. State

-

Dooming

Challenges to Appellate Counsel's Effectiveness
Introduction
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ushered in significant changes in
capital post-conviction procedure in Walker v. State.' One of several controversial
2
issues involved in Walker is the court's departure, purportedly mandated by recent
3
amendments to Oklahoma's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, from the
traditional test for effective assistance of appellate counsel.4
Although the United States Supreme Court has articulated a test for evaluating
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel,5 it has yet to define appropriate standards
for judging claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In the absence of
direction from the United States Supreme Court, each circuit court of appeals has
applied the same test regardless of whether the alleged ineffectiveness occurred at
the trial or appellate level.' The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, too, imitated
7
the United States Supreme Court prior to its decision in Walker.
This note examines the innovative Walker standard for judging claims of
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Part I explores the constitutional bases for the
right to competent counsel on appeal, as well as the historical standard for
evaluating effectiveness. Part II relates the facts and holdings of Walker and studies
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' renouncement of precedent. Part III
analyzes the significant effect the Walker decision will have on post-conviction
petitioners' chances of prevailing on ineffectiveness claims. Finally, this note
criticizes the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for abandoning the test
annunciated by the United States Supreme Court.

1. 933 P.2d 327 (Okla. Cim. App. 1997).
2. See id. at 333 n.23 ("The dissent states that this Order 'effectively overturns the test this Court
has used for ineffective assistance of counsel.' On the contrary, it is the Legislature which has modified
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel analysis that this Court has traditionally followed in capital
post-conviction cases.").
3. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089 (Supp. 1995).
4. This note suggests that it is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' application of its new test,
not the test on its face, that represents a departure from precedent. See infra text accompanying notes
72-93.
5. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
6. See Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1,
20 (1994).
7. See, e.g., Pickens v. State, 910 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
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L FundamentalPrinciples
A. The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of
'Counsel for his defense."8 In Johnson v. Zerbst, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the appointment of counsel for an
indigent defendant in federal criminal prosecutions. Later, in Gideon v.
Wainwright,"° the Court extended the guarantees provided in the Sixth
Amendment's assistance of counsel clause to state criminal prosecutions through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Eventually, the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution guarantees not
merely the right to counsel, but also the right to effective assistance of counsel."
In McMann v. Richardson," the Court noted that "if the right of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the
mercies of incompetent counsel," and admonished that "judges should strive to
maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing
defendants in criminal cases in their courts."'" Unfortunately, not until 1984 did
the Court shed light on what may constitute "proper standards."
In Strickland v Washington,4 the United States Supreme Court introduced a
two-pronged test for evaluating a defendant's claim that the right to the effective
assistance of counsel at a criminal trial was denied. First, the defendant must show
that the counsel's performance was deficient. 5 Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Under Strickland, a court
need not analyze these prongs in any particular order. 7 Thus, a court need not first
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.'"
Regarding the deficiency prong, the Strickland Court held that the proper standard
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance under prevailing
professional norms. The Court delineated certain basic duties that an attorney
owes a criminal defendant, such as loyalty and avoidance of conflicts of interest, but
feared that establishing more exact guidelines for representation could detract the

8.
9.
10.
1.
12.
13.
14.

U.S. CONST. anend. VI.

304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955).
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Id. at 771.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).

15. See id. at 687
16. See id.
17. See id. at 696

18. See id.
19. See id. at 687
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attorney from his overriding responsibility to advocate vigorously the defendant's
cause." Under Strickland,judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance must be
highly deferential. 2 Courts evaluating attorney effectiveness must indulge a strong
presumption that the attorney's conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable
professional assistance?
A showing by a criminal defendant that the attorney's performance was deficient
will not in itself warrant setting aside the lower court's judgment.' It is imperative
that the defendant also demonstrate that the attorney's error prejudiced the defense.
Clarifying the notion of prejudice, the Strickland Court noted that the defendant
must do more than show that the error had some conceivable effect on the outcome
of the proceeding. 4 Rather, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, but for the attorney's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
The Strickland decision ended longstanding judicial confusion as to the standards
by which to measure attorney performance. Significantly, the Strickland Court
aimed its two-pronged test toward attorney performance at the trial level. While the
United States Supreme Court has stated that there is no constitutional right to
appeal,' it has held that where a state has created a right to appeal, the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee the right to counsel on appeal.27 In Evitts v. Lucey,' decided the year
after Strickland, the Court recognized that a first appeal as of right does not accord
with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of
counsel.
B. The Oklahoma Court of CriminalAppeals' Treatment of Ineffective Assistance
of Appellate Counsel Claims Priorto Walker v. State
For many years following the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals employed the two-pronged
test in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In Sellers v.
State,29 the court noted that both trial and appellate counsels' performance must
meet the standard set forth in Strickland. Spears v. State" illustrates the
straightforward manner in which the court typically applied the two-pronged test:
"To determine if the performance of appellate counsel constituted the denial of
reasonably competent assistance of counsel under prevailing professional norms, this

20. See id. at 688-89.

21. See id. at 689.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 691.
24. See id. at 693.

25. See id. at 694.
26. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
27. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
28. 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
29. 889 P.2d 895, 898 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
30. 924 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
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Court reviews the record to determine if appellate counsel's performance was
deficient and whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant."'"
Spears was just arother decision in a steady line of cases applying the Strickland
test to ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims?2 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals decided Spears in September 1996."3 A mere three months later,
the court abruptly and radically departed from that precedent in Walker v. State.
II. Walker v. State
A. Facts of the Case
A Tulsa County jury convicted Jack Dale Walker of first-degree murder and two
counts of felony asSault and sentenced him to death.' On appeal, the court of
criminal appeals affirmed the convictions as well as the imposition of the death
penalty? In accordance with the 1995 amendments to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (the Act),3" Walker filed an application for post-conviction
relief in the court of criminal appeals. In his application, Walker claimed he was
entitled to relief on several grounds, including that he was denied his right to
effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.37
Before addressing Walker's specific propositions, the court emphasized the narrow
scope of review available on collateral appeal under the Act." The Act provides,
in pertinent part, that a defendant may only raise on post-conviction appeal those
issues that "were not and could not have been raised on direct appeal" and that
"support a conclusion either that the outcome of the trial would have been different
but for the errors or that the defendant is factually innocent."39 The court reiterated
a notion it had expounded in previous cases - that the Act was "neither designed

31. Id. at 780.
32. See, e.g., Medlozk v. State, 927 P.2d 1069 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); Stiles v. State, 902 P.2d
1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Paxton v. State, 867 P.2d 1309 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
33. Interestingly, Spears and several other cases in which the Court of Criminal Appeals applied
Strickland were decided after the 1995 amendments to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
which the Walker court said mandated its departure from Strickland. See infra text accompanying note

68.
34. Walker went to his girlfriend's trailer home and stabbed to death his girlfriend and another man
present. Walker told the police that he went to the trailer with the intention of either murdering his
girlfriend or taking their baby from her.

35. See Walker v. State, 887 P.2d 301, 305 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
36. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(1) (Supp. 1995) (stating that an application for post-conviction
relief shall be filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals).
37. Walker's other claims-that Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act is unconstitutional, that

the jury was improperly instructed on a clear and convincing standard for determining competency, that
the trial court failed to follow the statutorily mandated procedure to determine his competency, that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that the State had to prove all the material allegations beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he was sentenced to death while incompetent, and that juror misconduct deprived
him of a fair trial - are irrelevant to the purpose of this note.
38. See Walker v. State, 933 P.2d 327, 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
39. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(C) (Supp. 1995).
40. See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 896 P.2d 566, 569 (Okla. Crim. App., 1995).
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nor intended to provide applicants another direct appeal."'" Rather, according to
the court, the legislative intent behind the Act was to "honor and preserve the legal
principle of finality of judgment."42 With this legislative intent in mind, the court
denied each of Walker's claims for relief.43
B. Decision of the Case
1. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel
Walker's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim provides a good illustration
of the narrow scope of review allowed on post-conviction appeal under the Act. The
Act provides "a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which requires fact
finding outside the direct appeal record" as an example of an issue that could not
have been properly raised.' The court, paraphrasing this provision in prohibitive
terms, stated that it "may not review Walker's post-conviction claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel if the facts generating those claims were available to
Walker's direct appeal attorney and thus either were or could have been used in his
direct appeal.""
Walker claimed that his trial attorney was ineffective for several reasons. Walker
alleged, for instance, that his trial attorney failed to prepare adequately for trial,
failed to seat a fair and impartial jury, and failed to present available evidence at
Walker's competency hearing.' Walker attempted to substantiate these claims by
introducing medical records and affidavits from himself and his trial attorney. The
court found that notwithstanding the fact that these documents were not physically
present in Walker's direct appeal record, the facts contained within them were
available to his direct appeal attorney, and could therefore have been argued on
direct appeal.4 In other words, the court refused to consider Walker's claims of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel because evaluation of the claifns did not require fact
finding outside the scope of information available to his attorney at the time of his
direct appeal.48 The claims were, in essence, procedurally barred.
2. Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel
In addition to a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel requiring factfinding outside the direct appeal record, the Act provides that a claim could not
have been previously raised if it
is a claim contained in an original timely application for postconviction relief relating to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
and the Court of Criminal Appeals first finds that if the allegations were

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Walker, 933 P.2d at 330.
Id. at 331.
See id. at 340.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(4)(b)(1) (Supp. 1995).
Walker, 933 P.2d at 332.
See id. at 331-32.

47. See id. at 332.
48. See id.
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true, the performance of appellate counsel constitutes the denial of
reasonably competent assistance under prevailing professional norms.49
From this legislative provision, the Walker court fashioned a three-pronged test to
replace the Strickland two-pronged test for evaluating ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel? The threshold inquiry now becomes (1) whether appellate counsel
actually committed the act which gave rise to the ineffective assistance allegation.
If the petitioner establishes that his appellate counsel actually performed in a
manner supporting the allegation, the court then asks (2) whether such performance
was deficient under the first prong of Strickland. If the petitioner proves deficient
attorney performance, the court may then consider the mishandled claims, asking
(3) whether the claims support a conclusion either that the outcome of the trial
would have been different but for the errors or that the defendant is factually
innocent."
Walker offered several reasons for concluding that he was denied his right to
effective assistance of appellate counsel. First, he alleged that Johnie O'Neal, his
direct appeal attorney, had a conflict of interest, resulting in the omission on direct
appeal of all the alleged instances of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. 2 Second,
Walker alleged that O'Neal was ineffective *because O'Neal failed to raise three
substantive issues that Walker believed would have warranted relief on direct
appeal: (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the presumption of "not
guilty" rather than on the presumption of innocence; (2) police improperly obtained
Walker's statement and there was no hearing to determine the statement's
voluntariness; and (3) the trial court did not properly determine Walker's competen53
cy.
The court evaluated each of these claims according to its new test, and in so
doing clarified the requirements of the first two prongs. In practical application, the
first prong simply entails the court reviewing the direct appeal record to see if
appellate counsel in fact did or failed to do that which the petitioner alleged. For
instance, as to Walker's claim that O'Neal had a conflict of interest which caused
him to omit the allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the court reviewed the
record and indeed noted the absence of these allegations.'
In clarifying the second prong - whether the attorney's performance was
deficient - the court reiterated the Strickland Court's notions of the general duties
attorneys owe their clients. The court was quick to note that appellate counsel's duty
to advocate his client's cause does not require him to raise all nonfrivolous issues
available.55 The court echoed Stricklands mandate of high deference in assessing
an attorney's performance, noting that it must "evaluate appellate counsel's

49. 22 OKLA. STAT § 1089(D)(4)(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).
50. See Walker, 933 P.2d at 333.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

332-33.
333.
335.
334.
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challenged conduct from counsel's perspective at the time" and "indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
'
professional assistance."56
Indulgence the court preached and indulgence the court practiced. The court did
not deem that any of O'Neal's challenged acts or omissions compelled a conclusion
that his performance was constitutionally deficient, and the court's analysis ended.
As a result, the Walker court never had the opportunity to implement its third prong.
III. Analysis of the Walker Decision
A. The Implications of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' Departurefrom
Precedent
1. Three Prongs Rather than Two
The Oklahoma legislature, committed to the legal principle of finality of
judgment s restricted the scope of review available to post-conviction petitioners.
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the only issues the court of
criminal appeals may review are those that "were not and could not have been
raised on direct appeal," and that "support a conclusion either that the outcome of
the trial would have been different but for the errors or that the defendant is
factually innocent."5 An example offered by the legislature of a ground that could
not have been previously raised is an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.59 However, the legislature confines the court's review of such claims to
situations in which the court "first finds that if the allegations were true, the
performance of appellate counsel constitutes the denial of reasonably competent
assistance of counsel under prevailing professional norms."'
For well over a year following the Oklahoma legislature's adoption of this
statutory language, the court of criminal appeals continued evaluating claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to the historical Strickland
standard.6 Suddenly and inexplicably, while reviewing Walker's application for
post-conviction relief, an application like so many others before it, the court decided
that the legislature actually intended to revolutionize the ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel test. The court translated the statutory language "[if] the Court of
Criminal Appeals first finds that the allegations in the application were true' ' 2 into
its new test's first prong: "whether appellate counsel actually committed the act

56. Id. at 336 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
57. See id. at 331 n.16 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,491 (1991) ("One of the law's very
objectives is the finality of its judgments.")).
58. 22 OKLA STAT. § 1089(C) (Supp. 1995).

59. See id. § 1089(D)(4)(b)(2).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Medlock v. State, 927 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that

where the defendant is not prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise an issue, the court need not
determine whether counsel's performance in failing to raise such claim was deficient).
62. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(4)(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).
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which gave rise to the ineffective assistance allegation.' ' Out of the Act's words,
"the performance of appellate counsel constitutes the denial of reasonably competent
assistance of counsel under prevailing professional norms,"'6 the court created
prong two: "whether such performance was deficient under the first prong of the
two-pronged test in Strickland v. Washington.' Finally, the court transformed the
statute's prerequisite to post-conviction review, that "the outcome of the trial would
have been different but for the errors or that the defendant is factually innocent,"'
into prong three.67
The majority was adamant in its assertion that the legislature, not the court,
mandated the modification of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
analysis.' In his concurring opinion, Judge Lumpkin criticized the language of
Oklahoma's post-conviction statute as "vague at best and utterly confusing at
worst."
Though conceding that the three-pronged test is one possible
interpretation of the statute, Judge Lumpkin correctly disbelieved that the legislature,
despite its use of such imprecise language, intended to alter the way the court had
long handled claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel."
Assuming, arguendo, that the Act indeed necessitated the implementation of a test
with three prongs -ather than two, the test appears on its face to be merely
Strickland by another name. The first prong of the Walker test is simply a
procedural requirement. To answer the threshold inquiry - whether appellate
counsel actually committed the act which gave rise to the ineffective assistance
allegation - the court need only refer to the direct appeal record. Judge Lumpkin
adeptly assessed the practical implication of prong one:
Since in virtually all cases, the allegation is that appellate counsel failed
to present a claim in the direct appeal, the first prong is virtually always
going to be met, as that omission will be readily apparent from the
record. A requirement which fails to differentiate one case from another
is, at best, a requirement with no teeth; at worst, it is no requirement at
all.7'
The second prong - whether such performance was deficient - is by its own
terms a direct application of Strickland. The third prong - that the claim must
support a conclusion that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for
the errors or that the defendant is factually innocent - seems strangely reminiscent
of Stricklands prejudice prong. Under this analysis, because prong one is really no
prong at all, the Walker test is analytically indistinct from the Strickland test. The

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Walker, 933 P.2d at 333.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(4)(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).
Walker, 933 P.2d at 333.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(C)(2) (Supp. 1995).
See Walker, 933 P.2d at 333.
See id. at 333 n.23.
Id. at 341.
See id.
Id.
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court of criminal appeals' application of its three-pronged test, however, is quite the
contrary.
2. The Application of the Three Prongs
In Strickland, the Supreme Court noted that courts need not approach an
ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry in any particular order. Under Strickland,
a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.' In sharp contrast, the Walker court established the first prong as a
threshold for consideration of the second, and the second prong as a threshold for
the third. It is this unique application of the test, not the test on its face, that
constitutes a radical departure from precedent.
The Walker court expressly and purposely discarded the "prejudice" prong of the
Strickland test.!3 In his Walker concurrence, Judge Lumpkin expressed his dismay
at the court of criminal appeals' abandonment of the prejudice requirement. Citing
Strickland for the proposition that "the benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result,"'74 Judge Lumpkin maintained that in order to make that
assessment, both prongs of the Strickland test must be met! 5 The premise of
Strickland, argued Judge Lumpkin, is based on a petititioner's showing two
requirements, deficient performance and prejudice 6 According to Judge Lumpkin,
"the language describing one is supported by the language describing the other. One
cannot separate the two parts and expect either one to function properly alone."'
Unquestionably, the prejudice component had previously been a vital and integral
part of the court of criminal appeals' evaluations of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claims. In Hooks v. State," a 1995 case before the court of
criminal appeals, a capital post-conviction petitioner claimed that his direct appeal
attorneys were ineffective because they failed to raise meritorious claims and
inadequately briefed the claims they did raise. The court of criminal appeals noted
that the substantive claims had been either technically waived for not having been
previously raised, or technically barred by the doctrine of res judicata for having
been previously considered? 9 The court recognized, however, that post-conviction
appeal provided the petitioner his first opportunity to argue appellate counsels'
ineffectiveness.' Accordingly, the court examined the substantive issues on the
merits to determine whether, despite appellate counsels' omission of certain of these

72. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
73. See Walker, 933 P.2d at 333, n.24.
74. Id. at 341 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).

75. See id. at 342.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. 902 P.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
79. See id. at 1123.

80. See id.
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substantive issues and poor briefing of certain other of these substantive issues, the
attorneys' performance met Strickland's requirement of reasonably effective
assistance of counsel. 81
Likewise, in Pickens v. State,' the court of criminal appeals evaluated technically waived substantive claims on the merits in order to determine whether the
petitioner was denied his right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel. In
both Hooks and Pickens, the court demanded that the petitioner establish that his
appellate counsel failed to raise issues warranting reversal, modification of sentence,
or remand for resentencing. In other words, the court demanded a showing of
prejudice.
The Tenth Circuit's handling of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims
further illustrates the symbiotic relationship historically manifest between the
deficiency and prejudice prongs. In Banks v. Reynolds," the Tenth Circuit dealt
with a habeas corpus petitioner's claims that his appellate attorney was ineffective
for withholding exculpatory information on direct appeal. The Tenth Circuit stated
that "when a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue."' "The
question of 'prejudice' in the context of an ineffective assistance claim," noted the
Tenth Circuit, "necessarily requires a reviewing court to look at the merits of the
underlying claim."'
It is clear from these cases that Judge Lumpkin was correct. In all Oklahoma
precedent, both state and federal, the language describing deficiency was supported
by the language describing prejudice. Historically, Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma
state courts have interpreted the deficiency prong of Strickland as a function of the
effects or consequence., of appellate counsel's acts or omissions. These courts have,
in other words, looked at the substantive claim.
Under Walker, the court of criminal appeals explicitly precludes review of the
substantive claim. The Walker court offered a rationale for this departure: capital
post-conviction petitioners, of course desiring full review of technically waived
substantive claims, had discovered an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel as a method of achieving this goal. ' Prior to the inception of the threepronged procedural scheme, said the Walker court, post-conviction petitioners would
simply argue their technically barred substantive claims, and then summarily
conclude that their appellate counsel's decision not to raise them constituted
ineffectiveness under the Strickland test!'
The Walker court lamented that in applying the "prejudice" prong of the
Strickland test, it was essentially forced to examine the merits of the technically
waived claim to determine whether the claim was so serious as to deprive the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.
910 P.2d 1063 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
54 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1515.
Id. at 1516.
See Walker, 933 P.2c at 334.
See id.
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defendant of a fair trial." Triumphantly, the court announced that this would no
longer be the case. The Walker court's solution mandated that capital postconviction petitioners prove deficient attorney performance as a precondition to
having their underlying claim reviewed." Thus, the new approach allows the court
to analyze fully this "pivotal and narrow threshold issue" without examining the
merits of the technically waived substantive claim.'
Strangely, Judge Lumpkin, who was so astute in his analysis that the Act did not
mandate implementation of a three-pronged test, dramatically misjudged the
implications of this new test. The main thrust of his discontent is that by its
abandonment of the prejudice requirement, the court of criminal appeals has created
a more lenient test for evaluating ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims.' According to Judge Lumpkin, the "prejudice" prong of Strickland is more
strict than prong three of the Walker test. Under prong three of the Walker test, the
petitioner must show "either that the outcome of the trial would have been different
but for the errors or that the defendant is factually innocent."' Judge Lumpkin's
quarrel is that Strickland demands a showing that counsel's deficient performance
rendered the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair rather than a
mere look at whether the outcome would have been different.93
Judge Lumpkin's concern is misplaced. The flaw of the three-pronged Walker test
is not that its third prong is not as strict as the "prejudice" prong of Strickland.
Quite the contrary, the problem is that Walker's second prong, a threshold for
consideration of the third, represents such a high hurdle that the third prong will
rarely even be addressed. Far from creating a more lenient standard, as Judge
Lumpkin believed, the Walker test presents an obstacle for post-conviction
petitioners that is perhaps insurmountable.
3. Deficiency Defined
Under Walker's unique interpretation of deficient attorney performance, capital
post-conviction petitioners "must devote much greater time and attention to what
counsel did or did not do and why counsel's acts or omissions constituted deficient
performance."' Walker's specific allegations of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness
provide insight into the nature of evidence the court will demand to find deficient
performance under its new test.
Walker alleged that his trial counsel, O'Neal, was ineffective for failing to raise
several substantive claims. First, O'Neal failed to argue that police improperly
obtained Walker's statement, and that there was no hearing to determine the

88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id.

91. See id. at 342. Lumpkin also expressed dissatisfaction with prong one of the new Walker test.
See supra text accompanying note 71.
92. Id. at 333 n.25.
93. See id. at 342-43.
94. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
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statement's voluntariness.s Second, O'Neal failed to raise any arguments on direct
appeal regarding Walker's competency and how it was determined. 9 Third, O'Neal
failed to argue that Walker was in fact tried while incompetent.'
In addressing all of these allegations, the court noted that an attorney is not
ineffective simply because he failed to press an arguably meritorious claim."
Rather, the court demanded that Walker present facts, for example that O'Neal
breached a duty owed to him, to show that O'Neal's omission of these claims was
unreasonable under the circumstances or did not fall within the wide range of
professional assistance. Walker failed to present such facts, thus the court
declined to review the claims on the merits.
Another basis for Walker's claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel was that
O'Neal failed to raise meritorious claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness."' This
time, Walker did plead facts to show that O'Neal's omission of the claim was
unreasonable. Walker indicated that O'Neal was trial counsel's supervisor at the
Tulsa County Public Defender's office, and that O'Neal himself participated in the
trial.'"' Walker argued that O'Neal did not raise the ineffective assistance claim
on direct appeal for fear of exposing his own and his subordinate's poor legal
performance and jud;ment." The court, focusing on the fact that O'Neal's
involvement with the original trial was minimal, found that Walker failed to
establish that O'Neal was driven by an actual conflict of interest.'0" The court also
took into account the fact that Walker did not object to being represented by O'Neal
on direct appeal. Even though this time Walker indeed pled facts explaining why
O'Neal's performance was deficient, the court said this was still not enough.
The final basis for Walker's claim of ineffectiveness was that O'Neal failed to
attack the trial judge's improper "presumption of not guilty" instruction." Walker
again attempted to plead facts indicating that this omission constituted ineffective
assistance. He alleged that O'Neal did not raise this issue on appeal because he was
afraid that the judge who administered the improper instruction would retaliate by
having him fired." 'In support of this allegation, Walker submitted O'Neal's
affidavit in which O'Neal stated that fear of retaliation in fact motivated the omission." The court noted that when an attorney attests to his own ineffectiveness
in an effort to obtain relief for a capital post-conviction petitioner, the court will
thoroughly scrutinize the affidavit and rarely rely on it as sole support of a finding
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of deficient performance. 7 Again, Walker seemingly did what the court wanted.
He pled facts. Those facts were, however, insufficient.
4. The Ramifications of Creating the Second Prong as a Thresholdfor Consideration of the Third
Clearly, the court of criminal appeals has imposed upon capital post-conviction
petitioners a heavy burden to prove deficient performance. Nothing better illustrates
the dramatic implications of this heavy burden than the Walker court's refusal to
review the "presumed not guilty" issue on the merits. In Flores v. State,' the
court of criminal appeals reasoned that the "presumption of innocence" instruction
commands the jury to start their deliberations from the premise that there exists an
absence of guilt, while the "presumption of not guilty" instruction conveys that there
exists an absence of sufficient proof of guilt."° The Flores court stated that "while
the distinction is subtle, we find it amounts to an impermissible lessening
of the
0
burden of proof by expanding the degree of doubt that is permissible.'"'
The Tenth Circuit used the term "dead-bang winner" to refer to an issue which
was obvious from the record and which would have resulted in reversal on
appeal."' In United States v. Cook, the Tenth Circuit held that counsel's omission
of a "dead-bang winner" necessarily constitutes ineffective assistance." ' The
"presumed not guilty" instruction surely qualifies as a "dead-bang winner." In over
forty cases on direct appeal, the court of criminal appeals has reversed the trial
court on the basis of the "presumed not guilty" instruction forbidden under
Flores."1
Now under the three-pronged Walker test, a petitioner must prove deficient
performance as a threshold to consideration of the substantive claim. Because of the
virtual impossibility that the court will find an attorney's performance deficient,
capital post-conviction petitioners will be denied the opportunity to have considered
substantive claims warranting reversal. Had Walker landed in any court still using
the Strickland test, he would have succeeded in his challenge to the "presumed not
guilty" instruction." 4 Now, through a procedural nuance, Walker and others
following him will assuredly be dead-bang losers.
B. The Aftermath of Walker
Since the Walker decision, the court of criminal appeals has had several opportunities to exercise its three-pronged test, and specifically to refine its new for-

107. See id. at 336.
108. 896 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
109. See id. at 562.
110. Id.
111. See United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1995).
112. See id.
113. See Brian Lester Dupler, The Inglorious Revolution: Walker v. State and Capital PostConviction Procedure, 68 OKLA. B.J. 2624, 2629 (1997).
114. See id. ("Appellate counsel's omission of a Floresclaim would require relief under any scrupled
application of the Strickland test.").
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mulation of deficiency. The court has continued to require post-conviction
petitioners to "set forth facts and law which allow the court to fully assess appellate
counsel's allegedly deficient performance."... In Robinson v. State,16 a postconviction petitioner argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a meritorious claim on appeal. The court again found that mere evidence of
failure to present a claim is insufficient to support an allegation of ineffective
assistance." 7 This time, however, the court shed light on the kinds of "facts and
law" it would consider as evidence of ineffectiveness. The court suggested that the
petitioner could have indicated that appellate counsel was unaware of the allegedly
meritorious argument, that she did not research the issues, that she did not read the
relevant transcripts, or that she did not talk to witnesses in question." ' These facts
would go to the showing required under Walker of "what counsel did or did not do
and why counsel's acts or omissions constituted deficient performance."".
By requiring such facts, the court of criminal appeals has delivered on its promise
that the burden to prove deficient attorney performance is "heavy."'" Consequently, the entire three-tiered procedural scheme presents a difficult obstacle for
capital post-conviction petitioners. Many critics have argued that the Strickland twopronged test itself presents too difficult a hurdle for those arguing ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.' 2' In his Strickland dissent, Justice Marshall
accused the majority of being overly concerned "that undue receptivity to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too many defendants to raise such
claims and thereby would clog the courts with frivolous suits."'" Implicit in the
Strickland test is the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance."" Justice Marshall asserted that
"to tell lawyers ... that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave 'reasonably'
and must act like. a 'reasonably competent attorney' is to tell them almost
nothing."' 4 To Justice Marshall and similar Strickland detractors, according such
deference to attorneys undermines the constitutional right to counsel.
The Strickland majority, with all its deference to attorney practices, at least
recognized that ineffective assistance claims must be judged by whether or not the

115. Robinson v. State, 937 P.2d 101, 105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); see also McGregor v. State,
935 P.2d 332, 336 (Oklh. Crim. App. 1997); Rogers v. State, 934 P.2d 1093, 1098 (Okla. Crim, App.
1997).
116. 937 P.2d 101 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
117. See id. at 109.
118. See id.
119. Walker, 933 P.2d at 334 (emphasis added).
120. See id. at 333.
121. See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-BasedStandard
for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim.t, 77 GEO. L.J. 413 (1988); Alan W. Clarke,
ProceduralLabyrinths end the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1327 (1995).
122. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 713 (1984).
123. Id. at 669.
124. Id. at 707-08.
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trial produced a just result." The "prejudice prong" is crucial to this determination. In Oklahoma, attorneys still reap the benefits of judicial indulgence. In
fact, appellate attorneys are less likely to be found deficient because of the new
requirement that post-conviction petitioners plead specific facts and law to prove
deficiency. And now, no prejudice prong balances the equation. As the court of
criminal appeals' refusal to examine Walker's "presumed not guilty" objection on the
merits illustrates, there is now a reduced commitment to ensuring a just result. If
Strickland represented too high a burden on post-conviction petitioners, Walker
represents a virtual impossibility.
IV. Conclusion
When Jack Dale Walker filed his application for post-conviction relief, he
doubtless had no idea he would be the catalyst for substantial change in Oklahoma
post-conviction procedure. Unfortunately, the change has been for the worse, not
merely for Walker, but for any criminal defendant alleging ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. By renouncing the traditional United States Supreme Court test,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has made it even more difficult for capital
post-conviction petitioners to prove that their appellate attorneys were ineffective.
The Supreme Court's test applies to attorney effectiveness at the trial level.
Because of the dearth of Supreme Court authority concerning the proper standard
by which to evaluate attorney effectiveness at the appellate level, the court of
criminal appeals was free to apply whatever test it chose. Thus, the three-pronged
test should not be obliterated on grounds of unconstitutionality. Rather, the court
of criminal appeals should renounce its three-pronged test out of the interest in
fundamental fairness. At the heart of our criminal justice system lies the premise
that everyone, not just the innocent, deserves competent representation and a fair
trial. In Walker v. State, the court of criminal appeals went a long way in
undermining that value.
Jennifer Golm

125. See id. at 686.
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